Buffett Tests 2021: Summary
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
The earnings per share picture, once normalised, is quite consistent over five years.
But eps growth at Scott's over a five year period of 15% compares poorly with (say) Skellerup's 36%. One argument as to why the comparison is unfavourable could be that Scott's is going through a more transformative phase. Scotts want competent and adaptable engineering teams worldwide at several sites.
The drop in staff numbers in Asia since 2015 is because a then four year agreement with 25% China partner 'Teknatool International Ltd' came to an end in October 2015, with Scott's former joint venture staff then resized and reskilled to pursue Scott Technology projects only.
The good thing about Scotts having a manufacturing base in China, the United States, Europe and Australasia is that you can make your projects in a location that will avoid trade barriers. But the bad side to that strategy is that while trade barriers exist, you will always have some of your manufacturing base in the wrong place. Given Scott's results since the 'globalised bases of scale' strategy has come to fruition, I am not clear it is the right strategy. The fact that Scott's have been able to maintain fully imputed dividends while only around a quarter of the workforce is NZ based, shows how 'profitable' (sic) the overseas manufacturing bases are. Of course there may be some internal transfer pricing that artificially inflates the New Zealand contribution to profit when more than one manufacturing base contributes to a project, But it isn't clear that any of the overseas bases are real profit stars.
With Scott Technology we have a highly skilled workforce doing clever things and making very average profits. Of course there are plenty of technology companies out there that make no profits at all, and Scott's deserve kudos for actually making money while doing smart stuff. But the automated boning room project has been a disappointment of late, principally because the lamb boning room which was technologically very successful and profitable has such a small potential market. The real money in automated meat processing is in processing beef. And the larger beef carcass, more variable in size, seems to be proving problematic to adapt to the robotised technology proven in the lamb boning room.
It seems like CEO John Kippenberger looked at the business upon taking the CEO reins two years ago, then had some of the same doubts that I did. The 'adaptable teams' way of doing business at Scotts has been replaced by 'centres of excellence': Specialists doing what they do best at one site. Potential geographical constraints on trade have been (mostly) worked around - kudos for that! The Covid-19 pandemic means that it is difficult to judge the effectiveness of what looks like a radical rethinking of the way Scott's works 'by the numbers'. But what I can say is that 'earnings per share' of 14.2c (adjusted) is the best it has been since 2004 (when eps was 14.9cps, and Scott's was a very different and much smaller 'appliance production line manufacturer' only).
The one truth that has remained from those earlier days is that when appliance manufacturing line sales go well, then Scotts does well. That stands to reason. When you employ a lot of highly skilled tradespeople, you don't want them hanging around the workshops underutilised. It is difficult to get a good 'return on assets' (and in the case of Scotts, their best assets are not on the balance sheet, they are people) when the type of projects you are geared up to run are not firing. Adjusted ROE over FY2021, at 11.4%, was the best it has been since FY2013 (12.3%). But the more diversified Scotts becomes, the harder it becomes to get the whole internationally spread and diveresly experienced 'project teams' operating 'near peak' at the same time.
Right now 'Europe manufacturing' (see post 971) is effectively 'on the bench' as the rest of the Scott team plays on. I have looked at some of the Scott youtube videos on palletising and packing systems, showcasing the largely Belgian headquartered 'Scott Europe'.
https://www.youtube.com/c/ScottAutomationRobotics
It does look like very clever stuff. There has been cost cutting in Europe with the closure of the German workshop base, and with some work moving the Czech republic premises. 'In theory' Covid-19 should be a tailwind for 'Scott Europe'. Automated packaging systems reduce the human 'touch', and should combat disease spread (also through having less workers in a confined space). Yet capital commitments by manufacturing customers at a time when a business is under pressure is never a straightforward sell. Nevertheless I do think a real key to lifting the performance of the Scott group as a whole is a resurgence of 'Scott Europe'. By 'lift' I mean the potential to lift profits 50% above today's levels. That kind of profit lift is a juicy carrot worth staying invested for! But by when could that happen? I note as an aside that, as it stands today, profit margins for the group as a whole, at 5.2% for FY2021, are well below the pre-Covid-19 norms of 7 to 8%.
There are other headwinds too. Transbotics has moved on from its first generation AGVs that just followed painted lines, to 2G AGVs that navigate via lasers, to now looking at moving to a 3G system, where GPS guides a driverless vehicle's movements. I am not sure how much R&D is needed to make the transition to 3G AGVs. But I can't imagine the move is cheap. Elsewhere in the USA, Ohio, 'Robotworx', the reseller of refurbished robots, looks to be 'just plugging along' under a wave of Covid-19 uncertainty..
The biggest disappointment for me, from two years ago, has been the closing down of the automated pork processing project in Australia and the seeming end (although it hasn't been formally announced) of the fully automated beef processing project as well. Could it be that:
a/ The larger nature of these animals (as compared to a lamb),
b/ The more varied size of the carcass, and
c/ The consequent necessity to process these animals by halves (IOW you can't just take the way lambs are processed and 'scale it up'.)
are technical hurdles that are too difficult to clear? Ironically the great success of Scott's 'Bladestop' product in the beef industry, the safety bandsaw that nevertheless requires a human hand to operate, suggests that the prospects of a more comprehensive automation of the beef and pork processing lines may have indeed receded over the horizon.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
There have been other failures too. Scott Milktech, the robotised milking shed project, was first absorbed into the parent Scott Technology in 2017, as their industry partner sold out, and now it doesn't rate a mention in this years annual report or presentations. The HTS-110 company in Lower Hutt, a full subsidiary since 2014 battles away building applications with magnetic superconductor technology that is globally well respected in international academia and industry. Yet so far the king hit application that will really put HTS-110 on the map remains illusive. No matter. Should either of these business units get on board the commercial express train, then shareholders buying at today's prices will get the benefits 'for free'. In cutting edge technology, ultimate success is often the outcome of a series of failures.
Sometimes in 'cutting edge' technology it is necessary to 'wield the axe'. JK has ended a couple of my dreams with a final meltdown of the Milktech project, and the selling off of HTS-110. But I guess it had to be done?
To summarise, the Warren Buffett snapshot view: Well chosen operating niche, increasing profits, rather average return on capital (not unusual for a capital intensive industry I might add) with shrinking profit margins. There is as a bonus, no net company debt, which is always helpful when navigating uncertain times.
The 'glass half full' interpretation is that the company has been reset. And once the USA, and particularly Europe, gets back on line, sales and profits should accelerate. The 'glass half empty' interpretation is that the favourable confluence of cyclical factors in the Asia Pacific rim will turn south, capital expenditure on new projects will become more difficult to justify, and sales will settle at a level a little below what we see today.
I continue to have the 'glass half full' outlook. But I see the 'no net debt' position as a kind of 'safety net', that should allow the company to regroup again, should I be proven to be wrong. There is a significant growth premium (see my post 969) built into the share price today ($3.25 -$1.52=) $1.73. I think such a premium could be justified, if the full 'JK vision' for Scotts pans out. But I won't be adding any more shares to my holding at today's prices ($3.25, an adjusted PER of 23). And I think it is fair to say that I wouldn't expect Warren Buffett to be joining me on the share register any time soon.
SNOOPY
discl: hold SCT
Future Profit Forecasts from the Balance Sheet
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ferg
The profitability on projects is per my workings on post #951.
The best assessment for future profitability would be to assess future margins being future revenues x expected margin %. I know you are a long term guy so maybe use the average margin % achieved over the past 5 years being contract margin / contract revenue, assuming those figures are disclosed. Often the AR will show the forward workload of contracts, usually the figure they quote is what has not yet been recognised per column A less column H (they do not use column G). Note 2020 AR has this on page 35 at $85,297k. This will give you the best measure of forward profitability, being future workload x average margin observed. If however the margins are not disclosed an alternative (and rather raw) method would be to compare unrecognised revenue year on year - you want to see this figure growing (in conjunction with top line revenues growing) because it means they are growing their contract register and are securing forward workload. The figure they have disclosed of $85.2m is column A (per #951) less the revenue components of column H.
I had to dive back into my SCT annual report collection, in order to notice that this extra contract declaration information we are talking about has only been available since FY2019. The extra disclosure appears to result from the implementation of IFRS15 on 'Revenue from Contracts with Customers'.
|
FY2019 |
FY2020 |
FY2021 |
Unsatisfied long term fixed price contracts |
$78.205m |
$85.297m |
$71.302m |
Total Operational EBT Margin |
12.2% |
3.49% |
15.0% |
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ferg
Would the margins be those values disclosed on 2020AR p39 per the segment revenue & results? e.g. $6,498 / $186,073 = 3.49%? Or is that an all in margin that includes overheads etc? I don't know given I have only glanced at it.
Yes, the figures you have used to do your calculation 'Segment Profit' (EBT) of $6,498, divided by total revenue $186,073, would give an 'operational EBT profit margin' of 3.49%. (I have added into the table above the other two years for which this information is available). Back to FY2020, most of the overheads are in the 'Unallocated' column and total ($7.984m) before tax. If you regarded overheads as a 'fixed cost', then you could use your calculated 'operational EBT profit margin' to estimate a profit contribution from incremental projects. FY2020 looks to have been an outlier thanks to Covid-19 shock disruption.
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Ferg
One might apply some sort of weighting assuming fast moving goods and contracts are at lower margins and long term projects are at higher margins...perhaps?
Good idea, although it might be difficult to tease out the different profit margins on 'standardised contracts' verses 'system contracts' in practice. John Kippenberger's pledge to use more 'standardised modules' in system projects is his attempt to smooth out profitability across all categories of work. If the company can do incremental work while not increasing their labour bill (I am thinking Scott workers will be on a base pay rate, no matter how much work is on the company books) then incremental work should equal 'good profits'. So maybe a general EBT profit margin, such as you calculated, could work well as part of a future profit estimating forecast?
If we use an extrapolation form the FY2021 figures:
EBT (forecast from unsatisfied contracts) = 0.150 x $71.308m = $10.7m
How that figure will relate to EBT for HY2022 remains to be seen.
It can all go wrong though. I remember one year that Scott's were so busy, much of the work had to be farmed out to sub contractors to meet deadlines and shareholder profit virtually disappeared.
SNOOPY