List to starboard corrected
Well it had to happen sometime - I sold a Heartland share (or two).
I have finished a sell down of 35% of my HBL holding but currently I am intending to keep the remaining 65%.
Whether it or SCL is now the biggest holding in my NZ portfolio will literally depend on the market price.
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger
Tier 1 and Tier 2 Lending Ratios FY2015
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
Once again there is no mention of Tier 1 or Tier 2 in the Heartland FY2014 report.
The 'best case' scenario is that all loans are Tier 1. $2,564.266m of loans are outstanding. 20% of that figure is:
0.2 x $2,564.266m = $512.9m
Heartland has total equity of $452.6m which is still below the 20% of loan target no matter what the tier classification of the loans.
Result: FAIL TEST
PS Other posters have protested at my 20% of equity to back up the loan measuring stick in the past. 20% is not too far away from the 17% which by implication is judged acceptable by management under the watchful eye of Reserve Bank chairman Graeme Wheeler. The Reserve Bank further qualifies their views that a company of Heartlands credit rating still has a 1 in 30 chance of going broke in any year. I prefer to think in business cycles and 30 years will contain around five of those. So you could restate the Reserve Bank's view as saying that HNZ has a one in five chance of going broke at the bottom of the business cycle.
For me that investment risk is too high. So I am sticking to my 20% equity requirement, even if the Reserve Bank will settle for less.
I am a little overdue with this 'annual update, but better late than never.
Heartland has announced its intention for Heartland Bank to complete an issue of Tier 2 capital issue in FY2016, provided that market conditions remain favourable. An issue of Tier 2 capital would (in the absence of any other use) allow Heartland to return capital by way of a share buy back which would have a positive impact on ROE and EPS. This statement implies that at EOFY2015 30th June 2015) , all capital within Heartland was Tier 1 capital. It is nice to get confirmation of this, because this has been my assumption for several years. The awkward thing about this new Tier 2 capital is that it will make next years equivalent calculation more difficult!
$2,879.134m of loans are outstanding. 20% of that figure is:
0.2 x $2,879.134m = $575.8m
Heartland has total equity of $480.1m which is still below the 20% of loan target.
Result: FAIL TEST
Putting a number on it, the actual capital to loan ratio is:
$480.125m / $2,879.134m = 16.6%
This is down from the 17.6% of last year and now nearer the 17% equity that Heartland had when Governor Wheeler originally approved Heartland as a bank. Wheeler has of course slackened Heartland's requirement for capital since then. But the raw figure is not very encoraging, if progress is what you were seeking.
SNOOPY
Underlying Gearing Ratio FY2015
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
The underlying debt of the company (borrowings removed) according to the full year (FY2014) statement of financial position is:
$39.375m + $0.431m = $39.806m
To calculate the total underlying company assets we have to (at least) subtract the finance receivables from the total company assets. I would argue that you should also subtract the problem 'Investment Properties' and the unspecified 'Investments' from that total:
$3,016.888m - ($2,607.393m +$24.888m + $238.859m) = $145.748m
We are then asked to remove the intangible assets from the equation as well:
$145.798m - $47.421m = $98.327m
Now we have the information needed to calculate the underlying company debt net of all their lending activities:
$39.806m/$98.327m= 40.5% < 90%
Result: PASS TEST
The underlying debt of the company (borrowings removed) according to the full year (FY2015) statement of financial position is:
$46.020m + $7.869m = $53.889m
To calculate the total underlying company assets we have to (at least) subtract the finance receivables from the total company assets. I would argue that you should also subtract the 'Investment Properties' (the rump of the problem property portfolio) and the unspecified 'Investments' (held on behalf of policy beneficiaries) from that total:
$3,359.259m - ($2,862.070m +$24.513m + $329.338m) = $143.348m
We are then asked to remove the intangible assets from the equation as well:
$143.348m - $51.119m = $92.229m
Now we have the information needed to calculate the underlying company debt net of all their lending activities:
$53.889m/$92.229m= 58.4% < 90%
Result: PASS TEST
SNOOPY
EBIT to Interest Expense ratio FY2015
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
Updating for the full year result FY2014:
The EBIT figure is not in the financial statements. So I will use 'interest income' as an indicator for EBIT, once I have taken out the selling and administration costs
EBIT (high estimate) = $210.297m - $64.739m= $145.558m
Interest expense is listed as $101.221m.
So (EBIT)/(Interest Expense)= ($145.558)/($101.221)= 1.44 > 1.20
Result: PASS TEST, a significant improvement from the FY2013 position, which confirms the improvement reported during HY2014.
Updating for the full year result FY2015:
The EBIT figure is not in the financial statements. So I will use 'interest income' as an indicator for EBIT, once I have taken out the selling and administration costs
EBIT (high estimate) = $260.488m - $68.403m= $192.085m
Interest expense is listed as $126.041m.
So (EBIT)/(Interest Expense)= ($192.085)/($126.041)= 1.52 > 1.20
Result: PASS TEST
More progress here. A steady improvement from the FY2014 figure of 1.44
SNOOPY
Liquidity Buffer Ratio FY2015
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
Time to update the Liquidity Buffer ratio, the balance between monies borrowed and monies lent and matching up those maturity dates using a one year time horizon. The equation we are looking to satisfy is:
(Total Current Money to Draw On)/(Net Current Loans Outstanding) > 10%
On one side of the equation, we have borrowings.
HNZ BORROWINGS
HNZ has total borrowings of $2,524.460m (see note 28). This is made up of:
1/ Term deposits ($1,736.751m) lodged with Heartland. However, in a big change from FY2013…
2/ $555.708m of Bank Borrowings now appears on the balance sheet.
3/ Securitized Borrowings total $228.623m
4/ Subordinated Bonds (new for FY2014 but only worth $3.378m)
Note 28 does not contain a clear breakdown of current and longer-term borrowing amounts and their maturity dates.
Banking facilities are provided by CBA Australia but for both Australia and New Zealand. These facilities are, I believe, in relation to the recently acquired reverse mortgage portfolio. These banking facilities are secured over the homes on which the reverse mortgages have been taken out. These loans have a maturity date of 30th September 2019. That means they are classed as ‘long term’ for accounting purposes. Additional borrowing capacity is available up until 30th June 2016, but only if certain scheduled repayments are met by the Heartland group. It follows that Heartland can’t rely on CBA Australia as a source of short-term funds.
The information given in note 28 on the securitized borrowing facilities is as follows:
-------
The group has securitized bank facilities totalling $400m, all in relation to the Heartland ABCP Trust 1. (ABCP Trust) has a maturing facility of $400m maturing 4th February 2015,
These facilities are drawn by $229m (c.f. FY2013: $259m).
--------
Bank borrowings no longer explicitly rank equally with the securitized bonds. Therefore, I think it is safe to assume that if HNZ got into cashflow difficulty, the different classes of borrowings would be repaid in the following order:
1/ Bank Borrowings,
2/ Securitized Borrowings,
3/ Subordinated Bond (new for FY2014 but only worth $3.378m) and finally
4/ deposits from debenture holding customers.
IMO that represents a large new incremental risk for Heartland depositors that has received no media attention.
All securitized asset activity relates to a time-frame no more than one year out in the future, in this case just 6 months. Nevertheless, maturity date rollover renegotiations have happened without trouble over the last two years.
The amount of securitized holdings drawn has decreased by $30m (12%). This is a significant drop. The maximum amount that can be borrowed under securitized arrangements has dropped too since FY2013, from $500m to $400m. This is because the extra CBS Trust securitization arrangements, worth up to $100m, have been wound up. The net result of all this is that the borrowing headroom available using securitized bonds is now:
$400m - $226.6m = $173.4m
All four sources of drawn funds itemized have been on loaned to customers who want loans.
HNZ LENDINGS
Customers owe HNZ 'Finance Receivables' of $2,607,393,000. There is no breakdown in note 20 as to what loans are current or longer terms. However, if we look at note 39, we can see the expected maturity profile of total finance receivables due over the next twelve months.
$50.234m + $629.645m + $483.727m = $1,163.426m
These are offset by short-term borrowings for repayment over twelve months of
$18.922m + $242.431m + $195.682m = $457.035m
Thus the net expected maturity of receivables is:
$1,163.426m - $457.035m = $706.391m
If more money is coming in from customer loans being repaid, than is having to be repaid to the debenture holders, then this is a good thing for liquidity. There is no need to increase corporate borrowings to supplement debenture repayments.
=> Pass Short term liquidity test
I do note is that the amount borrowed as ‘debentures and deposits’ (borrowings) from customers has gone up by $426.9m (+21%) and the amount lent to customers (receivables) has gone up by $597.0m (+30%). This is a huge turnaround. In its formative years (FY2012 and FY2013) Heartland did nothing but shrink and now for the very first time it is growing. However finance receivables at fair value acquired as a result of the newly acquired “Heartland Home Equity Release” business were valued at $715.222m. That means the underlying legacy business at Heartland is continuing to shrink, down:
$715.2m - $597.0m = $118.2m
This is a drop of 6% in finance receivables terms.
Borrowing facilities have gone down by at least $100m over the same annual comparative period. So Heartland have upped their current period risk profile by having a smaller buffer to cover a growing mismatch between borrowings and receivables. It is still well within limits though!
Time to update the Liquidity Buffer ratio, the balance between monies borrowed and monies lent and matching up those maturity dates using a one year time horizon. The equation we are looking to satisfy is:
(Total Current Money to Draw On)/(Net Current Loans Outstanding) > 10%
On one side of the equation, we have borrowings.
HNZ BORROWINGS
HNZ has total borrowings of $2,825.245m (see note 13). This is made up of:
1/ Term deposits ($2,097.458m) lodged with Heartland.
2/ $465.779m of Bank Borrowings.
3/ Securitized Borrowings total: $258.630m
4/ Subordinated Bonds: $3.378m
Note 13 does not contain a clear breakdown of current and longer-term borrowing amounts and their maturity dates.
Banking facilities are provided by CBA Australia but for both Australia and New Zealand. These facilities are, I believe, in relation to the recently acquired reverse mortgage portfolio. These banking facilities are secured over the homes on which the reverse mortgages have been taken out. These loans have a maturity date of 30th September 2019. That means they are classed as ‘long term’ for accounting purposes. Additional borrowing capacity is available up until 30th June 2016, but only if certain scheduled repayments are met by the Heartland group. It follows that Heartland can’t rely on CBA Australia as a source of short-term funds.
The information given in note 13 on the securitized borrowing facilities is as follows:
-------
The group has securitized bank facilities totalling $350m, all in relation to the Heartland ABCP Trust 1. (ABCP Trust) has a maturing facility of $400m maturing 3rd February 2016. I do not expect any problem in rolling this facility over for another year.
The current level of drawings against this facility is not highlighted. (c.f. FY2014: $229m).
--------
Bank borrowings no longer explicitly rank equally with the securitized bonds. Therefore, I think it is safe to assume that if HNZ got into cashflow difficulty, the different classes of borrowings would be repaid in the following order:
1/ Bank Borrowings,
2/ Securitized Borrowings,
3/ Subordinated Bond (new from FY2014 but only worth $3.378m) and finally
4/ deposits from debenture holding customers.
IMO that represents a large new incremental risk for Heartland depositors that has received almost no media attention.
The maximum amount that can be borrowed under securitized arrangements has dropped too since FY2014, from $400m to $350m. The net result of this is that the borrowing headroom available using securitized bonds is now:
$350.0m - $258.6m = $91.4m
All four sources of drawn funds itemized have been "on loaned" to customers who want loans.
HNZ LENDINGS
Customers owe HNZ 'Finance Receivables' of $2,862,070,000. There is no breakdown in note 11 as to what loans are current or longer terms. However, if we look at note 20, we can see the expected maturity profile of total finance receivables due over the next twelve months.
$37.012m + $664.567m + $450.638m = $1,152.2175m
These are offset by short-term borrowings for repayment over twelve months of
$748.332m + $1,219.450m + $686.159m = $2,653.941m
Thus the net expected maturity of receivables is:
$1,152.2175m - $2,653.941m = -$1,501.724m
If more money is coming in from customer loans being repaid, than is having to be repaid to the debenture holders, then this is a good thing for liquidity. However, that is not the case here. There is possibly a need to renegotiate/increase corporate borrowings to supplement debenture repayments.
=> Fail Short term liquidity test
I do note is that the amount borrowed as ‘debentures and deposits’ (borrowings) from customers has gone up by $300.8m (+11.9%) and the amount lent to customers (receivables) has gone up by $254.7m (+9.7%).
Securitized borrowing facilities have gone down by $50m over the same annual comparative period. So Heartland have upped their current period risk profile by having a smaller buffer to cover a growing mismatch between borrowings and receivables.
SNOOPY
Admire you tenaciousness.
You will be able to do this all over again in about one month Snoopy.
Best rest up, so you all refreshed for your next dive into the Heartland depths.
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger
While there is confidence the contractual is not expected
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
...Customers owe HNZ 'Finance Receivables' of $2,862,070,000. There is no breakdown in note 11 as to what loans are current or longer terms. However, if we look at note 20, we can see the expected maturity profile of total finance receivables due over the next twelve months.
$37.012m + $664.567m + $450.638m = $1,152.2175m
These are offset by short-term borrowings for repayment over twelve months of
$748.332m + $1,219.450m + $686.159m = $2,653.941m
Thus the net expected maturity of receivables is:
$1,152.2175m - $2,653.941m = -$1,501.724m
...
Can I just point out that the figures you use are not the expected maturity numbers but the contractual maturity figures.
So for instance that $748.332m was probably sitting in peoples current accounts, on call savings accounts, etc.
So while people will demand some of that money now, by going to a hole in the wall and getting cash out or paying for the weeks supply of dog food with their debit card, they will not want it all. And on the flip side of this is that people also put their wages and dividend payments back in.
With both term deposits and loans, there is the expectation that people will take up new ones.
All banks work this way and fail your test on the contractual profile (you passed Heartland last year because you did use the expected numbers).
This contractual profile becomes important if there is a significant loss of confidence in the bank and everybody wants their money out asap.
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger
How Depositors are 'expected' to behave: FY2015 update
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Paper Tiger
Can I just point out that the figures you use are not the expected maturity numbers but the contractual maturity figures.
When looking at company liquidity, it is useful to have an estimate of how depositors are expected to behave in the coming year, rather than just looking at the maturiity dates of their cash funds/debentures.
Over FY2014 Heartland managment provided this information. But from FY2015 they do not. Below I have tabulated the 'expected' and 'contractual' depositor behaviour.
FY2013 Deposit Maturity (Financial Liabilities) |
Expected |
Contracted |
E/C |
On Demand |
$4.522m |
$452.201m |
1.00% |
0-6 months |
$413.371m |
$881.306m |
46.9% |
6-12 months |
$235.172m |
$648.567m |
36.2% |
FY2014 Deposit Maturity (Financial Liabilities) |
Expected |
Contracted |
E/C |
On Demand |
$18.922m |
$629.125m |
3.01% |
0-6 months |
$242.431m |
$748.129m |
32.4% |
6-12 months |
$195.682m |
$538.050m |
36.4% |
Of particular interest is the very small redemption rate from the on demand account, across both teh FY2013 and FY2014 years.
During FY2013 Heartland was still establishing a 'depositors profile'. So in my judgement the best indicative figures we have for FY2015 come from FY2014. My table of expected depositor behaviour for FY2015 follows:
FY2015 Deposit Maturity (Financial Liabilities) |
Expected |
Contracted |
E/C |
On Demand |
$22.450m |
$748.332m |
3.01% |
0-6 months |
$395.102m |
$1213.450m |
32.4% |
6-12 months |
$249.762m |
$686.159m |
36.4% |
SNOOPY
How Loan customers are 'expected' to behave: FY2015 Update
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Paper Tiger
Can I just point out that the figures you use are not the expected maturity numbers but the contractual maturity figures.
FY2013 Loan Maturity (Financial Liabilities) |
Expected |
Contracted |
E/C |
On Demand |
$185.782m |
$185.782m |
100% |
0-6 months |
$611.342m |
$628.167m |
97.3% |
6-12 months |
$542.352m |
$387.031m |
140% |
FY2014 Loan Maturity (Financial Receivables) |
Expected |
Contracted |
E/C |
On Demand |
$50.254m |
$50.254m |
100% |
0-6 months |
$629.445m |
$477.190m |
132% |
6-12 months |
$483.727m |
$367.564m |
132% |
Of particular interest is the very significant early cashing up of loans, (except for loans that are already payable on demand).
During FY2013, Heartland was still liquidating the problem property portfolio. So in my judgement the best indicative figures we have for an FY2015 forecast come from FY2014. My table of calculated expected customer loan initiator behaviour for FY2015 follows:
FY2015 Loan Maturity (Financial Receivables) |
Expected |
Contracted |
E/C |
On Demand |
$37.012m |
$37.012m |
100% |
0-6 months |
$877.215m |
$664.557m |
132% |
6-12 months |
$594.842m |
$450.638m |
132% |
SNOOPY
Liquidity Buffer Ratio FY2015: Iteration 2
As PT pointed out, my liquidity calculation used contractual cashflows not expected cashflows. This will likely give an incorrect result by assuming nothing is rolled over. Heartland no longer publishes 'expected' cashflows. This means I need to take an educated guess to derive them. I have previously posted my educated guesses on expected loan agreement maturities and debenture and call deposit maturities for FY2015. I repeat this information below:
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
My table of calculated expected customer loan initiator behaviour for FY2015 follows:
FY2015 Loan Maturity (Financial Receivables) |
Expected |
Contracted |
E/C |
On Demand |
$37.012m |
$37.012m |
100% |
0-6 months |
$877.215m |
$664.557m |
132% |
6-12 months |
$594.842m |
$450.638m |
132% |
Quote:
My table of expected depositor behaviour for FY2015 follows:
FY2015 Deposit Maturity (Financial Liabilities) |
Expected |
Contracted |
E/C |
On Demand |
$22.450m |
$748.332m |
3.01% |
0-6 months |
$395.102m |
$1213.450m |
32.4% |
6-12 months |
$249.762m |
$686.159m |
36.4% |
Time to update the Liquidity Buffer ratio for FY2015, the balance between monies borrowed and monies lent and matching up those maturity dates using a one year time horizon. The equation we are looking to satisfy is:
(Total Current Money to Draw On)/(Net Current Loans Outstanding) > 10%
On the numerator of the equation, we have borrowings.
HNZ BORROWINGS
1/ Term deposits lodged with Heartland. |
$2,097.458m |
2/ Bank Borrowings |
$465.779m |
3/ Securitized Borrowings total |
$258.630m |
4/ Subordinated Bonds |
$3.378m |
Total Borrowings of (see note 13) |
$2,825.245m |
Note 13 does not contain a clear breakdown of current and longer-term borrowing amounts and their maturity dates.
Banking facilities are provided by CBA Australia but for both Australia and New Zealand. These facilities are, I believe, in relation to the recently acquired reverse mortgage portfolio. These banking facilities are secured over the homes on which the reverse mortgages have been taken out. These loans have a maturity date of 30th September 2019. That means they are classed as ‘long term’ for accounting purposes. Heartland can’t rely on CBA Australia as a source of short-term funds.
The information given in note 13 on the securitized borrowing facilities is as follows:
-------
|
Total FY2015 |
Total FY2014 |
Facility Maturity Date FY2015 |
Securitized bank facilities total all in relation to the Heartland ABCP Trust 1 |
$350.000m |
$400.000m |
3rd February 2016 (*) |
less Current level of drawings against this facility |
$258.630m |
$228.623m |
equals Borrowing Headroom |
$91.370m {A} |
$171.377m |
(*) I do not expect any problem in rolling this facility over for another year.
--------
Bank borrowings no longer explicitly rank equally with the securitized bonds. Therefore, I think it is safe to assume that if HNZ got into cashflow difficulty, the different classes of borrowings would be repaid in the following order:
1/ Bank Borrowings,
2/ Securitized Borrowings,
3/ Subordinated Bond (new from FY2014 but only worth $3.378m) and finally
4/ deposits from debenture holding customers.
IMO that represents a large new incremental risk for Heartland depositors that has received almost no media attention.
All four sources of drawn funds itemized have been "on loaned" to customers who want loans.
HNZ LENDINGS
Customers owe HNZ 'Finance Receivables' of $2,862,070,000. There is no breakdown in note 11 as to what loans are current or longer terms. However, if we look at note 20, we can derive the expected maturity profile of total finance receivables due over the next twelve months.
|
On Demand |
0-6 Months |
6-12 Months |
Total |
Expected Receivables Due |
$37.012m |
+ $877.215m |
+ $594.842m |
= $1,509.069m |
less Expected Deposits for Repayment |
$22.450m |
+ $395.102m |
+ $249.762m |
= $667.314m |
equals Net Expected Cash Into Business |
$14.562m |
$482.112m |
$345.080m |
$841.755m {B} |
If more money is coming in from customer loans being repaid, than is having to be repaid to the debenture holders, then this is a good thing for liquidity. That now is the case here.
Summing up:
(Total Current Money to Draw On)/(Net Expected Cashflow into Business)
= {A} / {B}
= $91.370m / $841.755m
= 10.8% > 10%
=> Pass Short term liquidity test (reversing the result of my most likely incorrect first iteration)
|
FY2015 |
FY2014 |
Amount lent to Customers (Receivables) |
$2,862.070m (+9.7%) |
$2,607.393m |
Total Borrowings |
$2,825.245m (+11.9%) |
$2,524.460m |
Amount borrowed from Customers (Debentures and Deposits) |
$2,097.458m (+20.8%) |
$1,736.751m |
Securitized borrowing facilities have gone down by $50m ($400m to $350m) over the same annual comparative period. So Heartland have upped their current period risk profile by having a smaller declared available loan buffer to cover any mismatch between maturing borrowings and maturing receivables.
SNOOPY
Diverted on Final Approach
This was going to be a simple post along the lines that the share price has taken a sharp turn southwards since they changed their name to have the word Bank in it and thus, obviously, this was a bad thing to have done.
But then I noticed this...
Quote:
Originally Posted by
winner69
Snoopy on the ANZ thread has done a lot of work analysing UDC and to some extent comparing it to Heartland.
The last paragraph of his last post is interesting and relevant to this thread -
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Snoopy
...Of course we all know that UDC isn't a 'real' finance company, even to the extent that they don't have to keep the Reserve Bank updated on their financial position. As long as the parent ANZ New Zealand (who have full control of the UDC purse strings) keeps their own disclosure up to date, the UDC are off the radar as far as the Reserve Bank of NZ is concerned. In practice UDC are simply a 'marketing arm' of the ANZ. If anything that might make UDC potentially more 'reckless' than fully independently owned finance companies. That's because they know that ANZ Bank will bail them out if they get into trouble. So I think it is interesting that in practice UDC are less reckless with their lending policies (hold a lower relative provision for credit impairment on the balance sheet) than Heartland.
SNOOPY
Hope Snoops doesn't mind me posting it here but his work does deserve some consideration.
So I have read all of Snoopy's original post and checked his figures and have no complaints there (though if anybody does want a good discussion of what are applicable inclusions and exclusions - do not phone me)...
But...
If UDC have a 1.43% impairment provision and Heartland have a 1.09% impairment provision then I do not see how the emphasised conclusion can be drawn from the data.
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger
The Possum Theory of Risk
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Paper Tiger
So I have read all of Snoopy's original post and checked his figures and have no complaints there (though if anybody does want a good discussion of what are applicable inclusions and exclusions - do not phone me)...
But...
If UDC have a 1.43% impairment provision and Heartland have a 1.09% impairment provision then I do not see how the emphasised conclusion can be drawn from the data.
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger
Quote:
Originally Posted by
percy
Neither do I...lol.
I have to admit I couldn't quite understand the post you both referred to either. This is a bit of a worry considering it was I that wrote it!
So perhaps I should back track a bit, to a more easily understood piece of kiwi culture: "the possum theory of risk".
The possum theory of risk goes like this.
Scenario 1: You are driving along in your car and you see no possums, either the reflections of their eyeballs, or flattened on the road. Does this mean there was no risk, or does it mean that you just didn't see the possums?
Scenario 2: You are driving along the road and you see lots of possum eyeball reflections at different stages, but you don't hit any. Do you see those possums as they scramble to the edge of the road for safety? Or are they frozen in the middle of the road caught in the headlights?
Scenario 3: You are driving along the road, you see a few possum eyeballs and you hit a few possums. You might say that a dead possum is written off. But as a fresh kill, do you stop, put it in the back of the wagon and skin and boil up the carcass to at least get some return from the beast? And are you really a reckless driver for hitting so many possums? Or are you a supreme driver for only hitting one or two possums when there are so many out there?
If this is all to cryptic for some of you, substitute 'bank manager' for driver, 'vulnerable loan' for possum, and 'impaired loan' for road kill possum and see where you get with the analogy !
SNOOPY
Notice that I am not using the B word
Quote:
Originally Posted by
Paper Tiger
{20-Jan-2016} Well it had to happen sometime - I sold a Heartland share (or two).
I have finished a sell down of 35% of my HBL holding but currently I am intending to keep the remaining 65%.
Whether it or SCL is now the biggest holding in my NZ portfolio will literally depend on the market price.
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger
Beginning to think that the best thing to buy with the proceeds of my Heartland sell-down is Heartland !
Best Wishes
Paper Tiger