Eh, what about all the legions of shareholders who bought over $1 and above 80 cents right up until July 2011?
And those who happily shelled out $180m for 120m shares at $1.50?
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Yes Balance,
although not belonging into the two categories above, I have held them for far to long after they shown so much promise years ago only to see the mang. of this co. blow it over the last 4 years.
The reason for feeling that they are still overvalued, Kupe having now just about peaked and the present mix that supposed to run the show seemingly having lost there gip on the rope some while ago and have yet to demonstrate that perception to be wrong, or showing any sign of having regained it.
What does this tell us about NZOG directors and management?
Still trust them with making and managing investments?
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/n...ectid=10797181
Although some of the evidence is contested and conclusions cannot be drawn ahead of the commission's final report, due by September 28, the inquiry heard some startling revelations about the causes of the tragedy.
INEFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT
The inquiry was told the mine had a "dysfunctional" culture.
MONEY AND PRODUCTION WOES
The company had invested some $350 million in a mine that was not delivering the annual 1.3m tonnes of high-grade coking coal it was meant to.
PRESSURES ON STAFF
The inquiry heard a disproportionate number of miners were relatively inexperienced. The manager in charge of the newly introduced hydraulic mining process received no formal training and had to learn on the job. Staff carried prohibited items like lighters and cellphones into the mine. One contractor was so concerned about a potential explosion that he would not enter the mine and later quit over safety concerns. There were allegations of workplace bullying.
SERIOUS METHANE ISSUES
Levels of flammable methane gas were known to be an issue but not enough was done about it. The inquiry heard the ventilation system was poorly designed and inadequate. Gas sensors were in a bad state of repair, improperly calibrated or deliberately tampered with. A new gas monitoring system was removed from the budget and advice to increase methane drainage capacity was not acted on by the time of the blast.
INADEQUATE ESCAPE PLANS
Mine safety manager Neville Rockhouse, who lost son Ben in the blast, said a 108m ventilation shaft used as the emergency escape route was too strenuous to climb. Half the ascent was up a vertical ladder that could hold only eight people and lacked platforms. Two men who attempted a test climb were unable to reach the surface. There was no hoist system to remove injured miners, and no refuge station despite repeated requests. Safety measures like a smoke-guidance system were delayed.
SUBSTANDARD INSPECTIONS
The Department of Labour's sole mines inspector gave evidence that a lack of specialist experts and on-site time made it difficult to assess health and safety issues. A former inspector said he faced an "impossible" workload and had not seen or acted on a long list of safety failures. The mine's own safety checks were also questioned. Mr Rockhouse was not told of incidents including gas spikes and tampering with sensors. He gave evidence that he was so busy with paperwork that he was rarely able to enter the mine.
FATAL CONSEQUENCES
Australian mining expert David Reece, who led an expert panel that helped the Department of Labour investigate the blast, gave evidence on the possible cause of the tragedy. He said a coalface had probably collapsed, expelling methane gas. The gas travelled up the mine and mixed with fresh air. A pump was switched on from the surface, causing electrical arcing that sparked the explosion. Another expert gave evidence the men were killed in the initial blast, either by the shockwave or suffocation.
A MUDDLED RESPONSE
The inquiry heard of chaos and confusion after the blast. Police in charge of the rescue operation lacked expertise. There were delays as key decisions were signed off in Wellington. Opinions were divided on whether it was safe to enter the mine. Experts believed the miners were dead and urged for the mine to be sealed to prevent further blasts, but authorities clung on to the hope of a rescue. A second blast followed five days later. Superintendent Gary Knowles gave a tearful apology over the way news of the deaths was broken to families. He accepted some aspects of the rescue could have been handled better, but said he did his best to save the miners.
Balance. The article you provided refers to PRC not NZOG. They are different companies.
Put it into context Balance. Anyone who holds just one share is sadly either naiive, greedy or having a flutter.
So NZO has lost >50% in the last two years. Yawn. Not exactly the only company to do so.
The issues surround PRC are real and not to be brushed over lightly. But life goes on and so does NZO. Ethical investment remains mired in its contradictions. Everyone else looks to trimming their mainsail and sailing with the wind. We are sorry.
Balance i read that report also and about 5 mins later i see you posted it on NZO and pike sites. I found it showed dysfunction was common everywhere only some of which can be pointed back at NZO or PIKE. The real tragady here is that the RC never gets to the real problem which was the way DOC and the greenies disallowed a road above the mine so air holes that i have mentioned about 10 times before could be made. The RC in the end gets down to just making the legal team richer and probably solves nothing more than what a pratical person could have stated in the first place.
That is a real cop-out if ever I read one!
You are 100% right about the air-holes, but that is not the point.
Once NZOG decided to proceed with Pike, as approved, absolute, total responsibility and accountability resided with directors and management to make the project work, and safe.
As we now all know, they failed abysmally.
All they did was to keep throwing money at the development and along the way, ignoring very obvious signs that things were going very badly at the mine.
29 good men, be them father, brother, son, friend or mate, died.
Don't let those men died in vain - by trying to shift the responsibility for safely operating the mine elsewhere.
Notice that none of the directors fronted at the RC? Cowardly behavior but to be expected, though.
But I will be the first to eat my words and apologise profusely - if the directors from NZOG on the board of Pike resign.
The Japanese has a word for it - 名誉.
Not sure I agree here. PRC went ahead with the project once those covenants were in place. It can therefore be assumed that PRC considered the project safe with the covenants, so responsibility for safety failures falls squarely on PRC. It has nothing to do with DOC. WRT to 'greenies', who or what are these beasties and how were their demands enshrined in the permits? Maybe you are referring to the illustrious Euginie Sage? - then F&B spokesperson and now MP?